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INTRODUCTION 
ach month, it seems, there are many new technological gadgets, 
hundreds of new smart phone applications, and Facebook 
changes that allow for increased information sharing and social 
contact.  While such technological advances can make our lives 
easier, provide for greater creative expression, and encourage more 
expansive sharing of ideas and thoughts, such improvements may lead 
to negative consequences that must be addressed. 
As with most modes of communication and expression, people 
have discovered numerous ways in which to abuse the advantages of 
the Internet.  The recent and ongoing spate of cyberbullying cases is a 
prime example of this problem.  In addition, cyberincitement of third 
parties to commit crimes against other persons allows individuals to 
reach a potentially much larger audience, over a longer period of 
time, than would be possible in a strictly offline environment.  An 
example of cyberincitement is the “Nuremberg Files” website in 
which a pro-life activist publicized detailed personal information of 
many doctors who conducted abortions.1  This information was 
placed next to graphic images of aborted fetuses.2  These images 
combined with the text of the website presumably reached radical 
anti-abortion activists—when a doctor was injured or killed, the 
website’s operators either printed the doctor’s name in gray or struck 
a line through his or her name.3 
 
1 John P. Cronan, The Next Challenge for the First Amendment: The Framework for an 
Internet Incitement Standard, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 425, 443–44 (2002). 
2 Id. at 444. 
3 Id. 
E
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Another form of disturbing behavior on the Internet is 
cyberstalking, which is the focus of this Comment.  Generally, 
stalking is defined as a course of repetitious conduct directed toward a 
specific individual that would cause a reasonable person to feel fear.4  
Cyberstalking involves “the use of the Internet, e-mail, or other 
electronic communications devices to stalk another person.”5  Several 
examples of cyberstalking include sending numerous harassing or 
threatening e-mails to another individual, creating a webpage devoted 
to threatening or harassing another individual, encouraging third 
parties online to stalk or cause harm to a specific person, and 
intimidating another person via an online chat system.6  Responses to 
a 2009 U.S. Department of Justice survey indicated that 
approximately one in four stalking victims who participated in the 
survey experienced some form of cyberstalking.7  As technology 
continues to progress, cyberstalking will become a more pervasive 
problem, which must be tackled sooner rather than later. 
Like other forms of cyber-victimization, cyberstalking presents 
unique problems that make it difficult for existing laws and law 
enforcement to adequately respond to and prevent criminal activity 
that is conducted using the Internet and other technological media.  
For example, cyberstalkers can easily remain anonymous online, and 
they can also take on the identity of their victims or any other third 
parties as a means to increase fear in the victims.8  Furthermore, 
because of the virtual context of cyberstalking, victims may be 
completely unaware of the perpetrator’s physical location—thereby 
potentially causing more fear and uneasiness in the victim.9 
In addition, along with the numerous law enforcement difficulties 
that cyberstalking has created, cyberstalking has altered the landscape 
of free speech litigation as it pertains to the crime.  Courts and 
American society more generally have long regarded the First 
 
4 Stalking Facts, NAT’L CENTER FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, http://www.ncvc.org/src/main 
.aspx?dbID=DB_statistics195 (last visited Sept. 28, 2011). 
5 U.S DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 1999 REPORT ON CYBERSTALKING: A NEW CHALLENGE FOR 
LAW ENFORCEMENT AND INDUSTRY, available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal 
/cybercrime/cyberstalking.htm. 
6 Naomi Harlin Goodno, Cyberstalking, a New Crime: Evaluating the Effectiveness of 
Current State and Federal Laws, 72 MO. L. REV. 125, 129 (2007). 
7 KATRINA BAUM ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STALKING VICTIMIZATION IN THE 
UNITED STATES 1 (2009), available at http://www.ncvc.org/src/AGP.Net/Components 
/DocumentViewer/Download.aspxnz?DocumentID=45862. 
8 Goodno, supra note 6, at 130–32. 
9 Id. at 129 
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Amendment as one of the primary hallmarks of the Constitution.10  
There are, however, several forms of expression that the First 
Amendment and its state constitutional counterparts do not protect 
because of their potential danger to society—such as threats, child 
pornography, and incitement to unlawful action.11  This Comment 
explores how lawmakers can tailor laws or create new legislation to 
effectively respond to the dangers of cyberstalking while adhering to 
the American commitment to free speech; this Comment narrows its 
analysis of this issue to Oregon law specifically. 
Part I of this Comment examines several free speech concerns as 
they pertain to stalking statutes, Oregon’s stalking laws, and the 
leading Oregon Supreme Court case regarding stalking, State v. 
Rangel.  Part II explores problems with the rule that Rangel set forth 
as it pertains to cyberstalking.  Finally, this Comment proposes 
possible changes to the Rangel standard and Oregon legislation in 
order to resolve the issues with the most recent law while maintaining 
Oregon’s adherence to freedom of expression. 
I 
FREE SPEECH IMPLICATIONS OF STALKING STATUTES AND THE 
OREGON STANDARD 
One of the main criticisms of many stalking statutes is that they are 
unconstitutionally overbroad, sweeping in expression that is protected 
under the federal and state constitutions.12  In order to avoid 
overbreadth challenges as they relate to expressive communications, 
many state statutes and court decisions require that the stalking 
defendant make a “credible threat” of violence against the victim.13  
A “credible threat” is, generally, “‘a verbal or written threat’ coupled 
‘with the apparent ability to carry out the threat’ so as to cause the 
victim fear.”14  There are, however, several problems with the 
credible threat requirement, especially as it pertains to 
cyberstalking.15 
 
10 See Cronan, supra note 1, at 426. 
11 Id. at 427. 
12 Silvija A. Stikis, Stopping Stalking, 81 GEO. L. J. 2771, 2783–84 (1993). 
13 Goodno, supra note 6, at 134–35. 
14 Id. at 135–36 (emphasis omitted). 
15 Id. at 136.  The issues with the credible threat requirement will be explored further 
infra Part II. 
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A.  Oregon Stalking Statutes 
The three main Oregon Revised Statutes (ORS) dealing with 
stalking are ORS 30.866, 163.730, and 163.732.  ORS 30.866 sets 
forth the elements of a civil stalking protective order,16 while ORS 
163.732 provides the elements of the crime of stalking.17  ORS 
163.730 supplies definitions for the criminal and civil statutes.18  
ORS 30.866 and 163.732 are fairly similar, but the criminal statute 
has a higher mens rea requirement than the civil statute; knowledge is 
the culpability level in ORS 163.732,19 while ORS 30.866 requires a 
minimum mens rea level of recklessness.20 
Stalking is a Class A misdemeanor in Oregon and a Class C felony 
if the perpetrator has been convicted of stalking before or if the 
perpetrator has violated a stalking protective order.21  ORS 163.732 
establishes three elements of criminal stalking: (1) “The person 
knowingly alarms or coerces another person or a member of that 
person’s immediate family or household by engaging in repeated and 
unwanted contact with the other person”; (2) It is objectively 
reasonable for an individual in the victim’s position to have been 
alarmed or coerced by the contact; and (3) “The repeated and 
unwanted contact causes the victim reasonable apprehension 
regarding” his or her personal safety or the personal safety of the 
victim’s immediate family or household member.22 
ORS 163.730 informs the meaning of ORS 163.732, defining the 
verb “alarm” as, “to cause apprehension or fear resulting from the 
perception of danger” and the verb “coerce” as, “to restrain, compel 
or dominate by force or threat.”23 
The concept most relevant to the free speech discussion is that of 
“contact.”  “Contact” includes appearing in the physical or visual 
presence of the other person, following the other person, “sending or 
making written or electronic communications in any form to the other 
person,” speaking with the other individual by any means, and 
communicating with the other individual through a third party.24  The 
 
16 OR. REV. STAT. § 30.866 (2003). 
17 Id. § 163.732.  This Comment will focus on this criminal statute. 
18 OR. REV. STAT. § 163.730 (2009). 
19 Id. § 163.732(1)(a). 
20 OR. REV. STAT. § 30.866(1)(a) (2003). 
21 OR. REV. STAT. § 163.732(2) (2009). 
22 Id. § 163.732(1). 
23 Id. § 163.730. 
24 Id. 
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contact provision in ORS 163.730 was a central piece of the Oregon 
Supreme Court’s constitutional analysis in State v. Rangel.25 
B.  State v. Rangel and the Court’s “Expressive Contacts” Analysis 
Article 1, section 8 of the Oregon Constitution provides: “No law 
shall be passed restraining the free expression of opinion, or 
restricting the right to speak, write, or print freely on any subject 
whatever; but every person shall be responsible for the abuse of this 
right.”26  Rangel focused on whether or not ORS 163.732 was 
overbroad, which would violate article 1, section 8 by criminalizing 
protected speech.27 
In Rangel, the Oregon Supreme Court held that Oregon’s criminal 
stalking statute, ORS 163.732, was not overbroad under the free 
speech provisions of the Oregon Constitution and the U.S. 
Constitution.28  Eduardo Rangel was the defendant, and the State 
charged him with “stalking by ‘unlawfully and knowingly alarm[ing 
the victim] by coming to her place of employment and threatening 
her’ on several occasions.”29  Because the charging document 
indicated that the defendant threatened the victim, the court concluded 
that there was a free speech issue under the state and federal 
constitutions.30  Specifically, the court analyzed whether the 
communicative contact provisions listed in ORS 163.730(3) and 
employed in ORS 163.732 criminalized protected speech under article 
1, section 8.31 
1.  The Robertson Framework 
In analyzing the issue of whether or not ORS 163.732 was 
overbroad, the court applied the Robertson framework that the 
Oregon Supreme Court established in 1982 in State v. Robertson,32 
which assessed the constitutionality of an Oregon coercion statute 
under article 1, section 8.33  In Robertson, the court established a 
three-pronged test to determine whether laws involving expression are 
 
25 State v. Rangel, 328 Or. 294, 298–300, 977 P.2d 379, 381–83 (1999). 
26 OR. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
27 Rangel, 328 Or. at 296, 977 P.2d at 380. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 297, 977 P.2d at 381. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 298–307, 977 P.2d at 382–87. 
32 Id. at 298, 977 P.2d at 382. 
33 State v. Robertson, 293 Or. 402, 404, 649 P.2d 569, 577 (1982). 
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overbroad.34  The first prong of the test provides that if a law is 
“directed to the substance of any ‘opinion’ or any ‘subject’ of 
communication,” then the law is unconstitutional unless it falls within 
a historical exception.35 
The second part of the Robertson framework defines what 
constitutes a “historical exception.”36  The court defined “historical 
exception” as an unprotected category of speech “that was well 
established when the first American guarantees of freedom of 
expression were adopted and that the guarantees then or in 1859 
demonstrably were not intended to reach.”37  The court listed several 
examples of historical exceptions, including solicitations of crimes, 
fraud and forgery and their modern variants, and several forms of 
theft.38 
If the law in question is directed to any subject of communication 
or the substance of an opinion but falls within a historical exception, a 
third analysis is required.39  The third prong “is referred to as the 
‘overbreadth and narrowing’ inquiry and is” used when either the law 
concerns speech but fits within a historical exception, or when the law 
involves both speech and the effects of speech.40  Essentially, the 
“overbreadth and narrowing” inquiry asks whether the law, as written, 
encompasses constitutionally protected activity and expression.41  If 
the statute proscribes constitutionally permissible activity or 
expression, then the statute is overbroad and unconstitutional unless it 
can be saved by a “judicially imposed narrowing construction.”42  A 
narrowing construction may be able to remove the constitutionally 
allowable expression from the statute, thereby redirecting the focus of 
the statute to only proscribable expression and activity.43  Oregon 
courts continue to use the Robertson framework to analyze the 
 
34 William R. Long, Requiem for Robertson: The Life and Death of a Free-Speech 
Framework in Oregon, 34 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 101, 109 (1998). 
35 Robertson, 293 Or. at 412, 649 P.2d at 576. 
36 Long, supra note 34. 
37 Robertson, 293 Or. at 412, 649 P.2d at 576. 
38 Id.  
39 Long, supra note 34. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 109–10. 
42 Id. at 110. 
43 Id. 
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constitutionality of laws involving expression and the effects of 
expression.44 
2.  Applying the Robertson Framework to Rangel 
The court in Rangel began its analysis of the constitutionality of 
ORS 163.732 by inquiring whether the statute was directed to the 
substance of opinions or to the subject of communications—the first 
prong of the Robertson test.45  The court determined that the criminal 
stalking statute did not proscribe the subject of communications or the 
substance of opinions; rather, the court concluded that the statute 
aimed to proscribe the forbidden effects of expression, mainly 
“repeated and unwanted ‘contacts.’”46  Therefore, article 1, section 8 
did not prohibit the enactment of ORS 163.732 outright.47  Because 
the statute did not directly concern speech or expression, the court did 
not examine the historical exceptions piece of the Robertson 
framework.48 
The court noted, however, that under Robertson, if a statute that is 
focused on forbidden effects, like ORS 167.732, proscribes written or 
verbal means used to produce those effects, the law must still “be 
scrutinized to determine whether it appears to reach privileged 
communication or whether it can be interpreted to avoid such 
‘overbreadth.’”49  Because the stalking statute criminalized the 
inducement of alarm or coercion through repeated and unwanted 
contacts, and because those contacts included speech or writing— 
“communicative” or “expressive contacts”—the court concluded that 
the statute restricted speech to a degree.50  Thus, the court needed to 
analyze whether it could impose a narrowing construction to avoid an 
overbreadth problem.51 
To assess whether a narrowing construction could have been 
applied to ORS 163.732, the court looked largely to a previous 
Oregon Supreme Court case, State v. Moyle, which dealt with the 
 
44 See, e.g., State v. Moyer, 348 Or. 220, 224, 230 P.3d 7, 10 (2010), cert. denied, 131 
S. Ct. 326 (2010). 
45 State v. Rangel, 328 Or. 294, 298–99, 977 P.2d 379, 382 (1999). 
46 Id. at 299, 977 P.2d at 382. 
47 Id. 
48 See Long, supra note 34. 
49 Rangel, 328 Or. at 299, 977 P.2d at 382. 
50 Id. at 301, 977 P.2d at 383. 
51 Id. at 302, 977 P.2d at 384. 
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Oregon harassment statute.52  The court interpreted the harassment 
statute in Moyle to be similar to the stalking statute at issue in Rangel; 
thus, the court concluded that the narrowing construction that the 
Moyle court used was applicable to Rangel.53 
The harassment statute in Moyle had a communicative expressions 
provision, which stated that a person commits harassment if he or she 
“‘[s]ubjects another to alarm by conveying a telephonic or written 
threat to inflict serious physical injury on that person . . . which threat 
reasonably would be expected to cause alarm.’”54  Even though the 
harassment statute did not explicitly require proof of a specific intent 
to effectuate the threat or of any present capacity to do so, the court 
held “that the elements of actual alarm and the reasonableness of the 
alarm under the circumstances had a similar purpose and effect.”55  
Such a conclusion is definitive of the credible threat requirement.56  
Therefore, the court’s eventual narrowing construction for the 
harassment statute required that individuals accused of harassment 
“ma[k]e a threat or its equivalent and . . . intend[] to cause the victim 
alarm.”57 
Because the harassment and criminal stalking statutes were similar, 
the Rangel court concluded that the text and legislative purpose of 
ORS 163.732 also required a credible threat.58  Therefore because 
ORS 163.732 contained a communicative contacts provision, the 
court followed the Moyle analysis in concluding that although ORS 
163.732 did not expressly require a credible threat, ORS 163.732(1)’s 
requirements of “actual alarm and the subjective and objective 
reasonableness of the alarm in the circumstances [had] the same 
purpose and effect.”59 
The Rangel court also determined that the elements of actual alarm 
and the objective and subjective reasonableness of the alarm “limit 
the reach of ORS 163.732(1) to a threat that is so unambiguous, 
unequivocal, and specific to the addressee that it convincingly 
expresses to the addressee the intention that it will be carried out” and 
 
52 Id. at 302–06, 977 P.2d at 384–86. 
53 Id. at 305–06, 977 P.2d at 386. 
54 Id. at 298 n.5, 977 P.2d at 381 n.5. 
55 Id. at 305, 977 P.2d at 385–86. 
56 See Goodno, supra note 6, at 135–36. 
57 Rangel, 328 Or. at 297, 977 P.2d at 381. 
58 Id. at 305–06, 977 P.2d at 386. 
59 Id. 
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that the speaker has the “present ability to do so.”60  In discussing 
how to further define the credible threat requirement under ORS 
163.732, the court referred to the Moyle court’s definition of a 
credible (or “proscribable”) threat, which defined the term as, “a 
communication that instills in the addressee a fear of imminent and 
serious personal violence from the speaker, is unequivocal, and is 
objectively likely to be followed by unlawful acts.”61  The court 
ultimately adopted the Moyle definition of a credible threat because 
the legislature intended that the term “alarm” be applied to the same 
form of communications as that to which it applied in the harassment 
statute.62  With the credible threat requirement, the court in Rangel 
successfully applied a narrowing construction to the criminal stalking 
statute, thereby avoiding an overbreadth issue under article 1, section 
8.63 
II 
PROBLEMS WITH THE RANGEL STANDARD AS IT PERTAINS TO 
CYBERSTALKING 
In light of numerous and extensive technological advances since 
the court decided Rangel in 1999, the Rangel rule as it stands and 
ORS 163.732 do not adequately address the crime of cyberstalking 
for several reasons.  First, there are multiple differences between 
offline stalking and cyberstalking that indicate that cyberstalking 
could potentially be more dangerous and cause more fear in victims 
than offline stalking.64  Second, the credible threat requirement that 
Rangel established is problematic because it does not recognize that 
many perpetrators (online and offline) can knowingly cause fear in 
victims without expressly making an overt threat.65  And third, there 
are issues with receipt of the threat, incitement of third parties, and 
the requirement that the stalker had the “present” or “apparent” ability 
to carry out the threat when the perpetrator communicates on the 
Internet or on another type of electronic device.66 
 
60 Id. at 306, 977 P.2d at 386. 
61 Id. at 303, 977 P.2d at 384. 
62 Id. at 303, 977 P.2d at 384–85. 
63 Id. at 306, 977 P.2d at 386. 
64 Goodno, supra note 6, at 128–32. 
65 See id. at 135–36. 
66 Id. at 137–39. 
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Furthermore, Rangel’s requirement that the threat instill in the 
victim “a fear of imminent and serious personal violence”67 is 
troublesome because determining “imminence” in the Internet age is 
incredibly difficult, if not impossible.68  For all of the foregoing 
reasons, Oregon’s stalking laws must be modified, or new laws must 
be passed, to effectively close technological loopholes that 
individuals have taken advantage of in frightening and harassing other 
people. 
A.  Differences Between Cyberstalking and Offline Stalking 
While cyberstalking is similar to offline stalking in certain ways,69 
there are differences between the two forms of the crime that indicate 
that courts must modify their approach to cyberstalking cases.70  
Cyberstalking and offline stalking are similar in that they both consist 
of a desire to control the victim by repeated threatening or harassing 
behavior, which may lead to more destructive and alarming 
conduct.71  Cyberstalking is disparate from offline stalking, however, 
in five significant ways that make it easier for perpetrators to frighten 
their victims and evade law enforcement.72  The five ways in which 
cyberstalking differs from offline stalking include: (1) the ability to be 
completely anonymous on the Internet, (2) instantaneous 
communication, (3) physical location of the stalker, (4) the ability of 
cyberstalkers to assume the identity of the victim, and (5) incitement 
of third parties.73 
1.  Anonymity 
First, cyberstalking differs from offline stalking in that the 
cyberstalker can harass, threaten, and emotionally harm the victim 
without the victim ever knowing the identity of the perpetrator.74  
While anonymity can advance free speech and allow individuals to 
express themselves more openly, anonymity can also facilitate 
harmful language by enabling individuals to use more extremist 
 
67 Van Buskirk v. Ryan, 233 Or. App. 170, 177, 225 P.3d 118, 122, review dismissed, 
348 Or. 218 (2010). 
68 Cronan, supra note 1, at 428. 
69 Goodno, supra note 6, at 128. 
70 See id. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 128–32. 
74 Id. at 130–31. 
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speech without having to deal with the consequences of attaching a 
name to their words.75  As one scholar observed, “When people are 
less accountable for their conduct, they are more likely to engage in 
unsavory acts.  When anonymous, people are often much nastier and 
more uncivil in their speech.”76 
In addition, anonymity creates a shield, or an opaque bubble, for 
cyberstalkers.  When cyberstalkers can hide behind this cloak, not 
only can they avoid culpability, but they can also cause more fear in 
their victims.77  When individuals have no conception of who is 
threatening them, it is difficult to evaluate the threat accurately, which 
may lead to more fear and uneasiness.78  To elaborate, if a stalker 
verbally threatens to harm the victim in an offline setting, the victim 
can likely take certain measures to protect him or herself—such as 
avoiding the stalker and calling law enforcement with the necessary 
personal and descriptive information to locate and apprehend the 
perpetrator.79  Online, however, victims of anonymous stalking have 
few means, if any, with which to counter the threat or determine its 
verity.80 
Furthermore, when the victim does not know the identity or 
physical features of the cyberstalker, law enforcement’s ability to 
investigate and locate the stalker is dramatically reduced.81  Another 
hurdle that the Internet presents in regards to anonymity is that 
cyberstalkers can delete electronic identifiers from their 
communications.82  In describing why a victim of offline and online 
stalking was unsuccessful in pressing cyberstalking charges against 
the suspect (even though she was successful in pressing offline 
stalking charges), an official from a North Carolina sheriff’s office 
stated, “‘With this type of offense, you have to be able to prove who 
is sitting behind the computer that actually is setting up the account 
 
75 Scott Hammack, The Internet Loophole: Why Threatening Speech On-Line Requires 
a Modification of the Courts’ Approach to True Threats and Incitement, 36 COLUM. J. L. 
& SOC. PROBS. 65, 83–84 (2002). 
76 DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND PRIVACY 
ON THE INTERNET 140 (2007). 
77 Hammack, supra note 75, at 84; see also Goodno, supra note 6, at 130 (explaining 
how the anonymity of the Internet enables people to use more threatening and harassing 
language against other individuals online). 
78 Hammack, supra note 75, at 84. 
79 See id. 
80 See id. 
81 Goodno, supra note 6, at 131. 
82 Id. 
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and doing this type of offense.’”83  The law enforcement officer 
further stated that even though the plaintiff could have potentially 
proven that the suspect owned the computer used to cyberstalk, mere 
ownership was insufficient for a cyberstalking conviction.84 
Moreover, cyberstalkers who threaten their victims anonymously 
can have an even stronger and more harmful psychological impact on 
their victims by taking advantage of individuals’ simple fear of the 
unknown.85  Even though a stalker’s anonymity might not affect 
whether a threat is carried out, or whether harm will truly occur, the 
anonymity has a tremendous impact on the victim’s sense of danger.86 
2.  Instantaneous Communication 
Second, cyberstalking is different from offline stalking in that 
cyberstalkers can threaten and harass victims instantaneously and 
with more frequency than offline stalkers can.87  In offline settings, 
the stalker must spend time repeatedly calling the victim or following 
the victim physically.88  On the Internet, however, the stalker can 
instantly send harassing or intimidating messages to the victim with a 
simple click of a button and a few key strokes.89  The cyberstalker 
can also easily set up his or her e-mail account to automatically send 
intimidating messages repeatedly—potentially thousands of times—to 
the victim.90 
Furthermore, the immediacy of Internet communications can 
amplify intimidating language because individuals have less time to 
reflect upon the effects of their words.91  Before the Internet became a 
pervasive element of social interaction, most individuals had a longer 
period of time between forming a thought or emotion and being able 
to express that thought or emotion to other people.92  In the age of the 
Internet, however, a “cooling off” period is nearly nonexistent; people 
can send frightening and harassing messages immediately without the 
 
83 Rockingham Co. Woman Victimized by Facebook Imposter, MYFOX8.COM (Feb. 24, 
2011), http://www.myfox8.com/news/wghp-story-terrorized-facebook-110224,0, 2567589 
.story. 
84 Id. 
85 Hammack, supra note 75, at 84. 
86 Id. 
87 Goodno, supra note 6, at 128–29. 
88 Id. at 129. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 Hammack, supra note 75, at 83. 
92 Id. 
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benefit of time allowing them to reflect upon the consequences of 
their language.93  As a result, intimidating and threatening Internet 
speech can potentially cause more harmful effects on society and 
instill more fear in the receivers of the speech.94 
3.  Physical Location of the Stalker 
Third, the limitless reach of the Internet makes cyberstalking 
potentially more harmful than offline stalking in a few ways.  In 
contrast to offline stalking, where stalkers are often confined to a 
limited physical area in which to instill fear in victims, cyberstalkers 
have the luxury of being able to terrify their victims from virtually 
anywhere in the world.95  Moreover, the Internet is simply faster and 
likely cheaper than other forms of communication, such as regular 
mail and using the telephone.96  This efficiency, combined with the 
omnipresence of the Internet, makes it incredibly easy for 
cyberstalkers to achieve their goal of exerting control over victims 
despite not always being physically close to their victims.  The 
inability to determine the cyberstalker’s whereabouts can cause the 
victim more fear in that he or she may be constantly fretting about 
whether the cyberstalker is next door, in a neighboring state, or 
perhaps in another country.97  This is another example of how, in 
addition to anonymity, cyberstalkers can capitalize on individuals’ 
fear of the unknown. 
In addition to increasing fear in victims, cyberstalking presents 
complicated issues for law enforcement in that cyberstalking may 
involve multiple jurisdictions.98  For example, when the cyberstalker 
and the victim are in two different states, prosecutors must determine 
which state’s laws apply.99  Conducting investigations in at least two 
different jurisdictions is thus naturally more time-consuming and 
complicated than it is in only one jurisdiction.100  Such difficulties 
can cause delays in investigation and adjudication and may make it 
easier for cyberstalkers to elude law enforcement and to continue to 
terrify their victims. 
 
93 Id. 
94 See id. 
95 Goodno, supra note 6, at 129. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 129–30. 
99 Id. at 129. 
100 Id. at 129–30. 
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4.  Cyberstalkers Can Assume the Identity of the Victim 
The fourth way in which cyberstalking is dissimilar from offline 
stalking is that cyberstalkers can take on the identity of the victim.101  
This type of scheme can create an alarming situation quickly and 
without the victim being aware of the cyberstalker’s actions.  For 
example, the cyberstalker can send offensive and lewd messages in 
the victim’s name or post similarly provocative comments on certain 
websites, allowing a wider audience to view the inflammatory 
speech.102  As a result, the victim may be banned from those websites 
and may be accused of inappropriate conduct; additionally, viewers of 
the posts and receivers of the messages may respond to the victim 
with similarly offensive language, threats, or perhaps even criminal 
activity.103  Or, as was the case in Osborne v. Fadden, individuals can 
use someone’s personal information to register the victim for services 
online—including pornography, expensive magazine subscriptions, 
and mortgage lending services, to name a few.104 
In a more frightening case out of California, a man took on his 
victim’s identity and posted her phone number and address online in 
her name, along with a message fantasizing about being raped.105  
Several men went to her house, referring to the Internet solicitation 
that was posted in her name.  Eventually authorities were able to 
locate and apprehend the suspect after the victim’s father responded 
to the stalker’s Internet posting, pretending to be someone who was 
interested in the rape fantasy.106  The cyberstalker was eventually 
convicted of “three counts of solicitation for sexual assault and one 
count of stalking”; the judge sentenced the defendant to six years in 
prison, asserting that “‘to give him anything less is insufficient to 
protect society.’”107 
 
101 Id. at 131. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104 Osborne v. Fadden, 225 Or. App. 431, 435, 201 P.3d 278, 281–82, review denied, 
346 Or. 213 (2009). 
105 Joanna Lee Mishler, Cyberstalking: Can Communication via the Internet Constitute 
a Credible Threat and Should an Internet Service Provider Be Liable if It Does?, 17 
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 115, 115–16 (2000). 
106 Id. at 116. 
107 Id. 
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5.  Incitement of Third Parties 
Finally, an important distinction between offline stalking and 
cyberstalking is that cyberstalkers can easily encourage other like-
minded individuals to stalk in their place.108  This scenario can arise 
when cyberstalkers post comments on discussion boards or send 
messages to other individuals inciting them to follow or harm a 
specific individual.  By creating an outlet in which cyberstalkers can 
communicate with others who support the cyberstalkers’ beliefs, thus 
causing them to think such beliefs are socially acceptable, the social 
aspect of discussion boards may even increase danger to many 
communities.109  In addition to fostering a sense of belonging, such 
forums often provide information and resources necessary to carry out 
a harmful or violent act.110 
For example, in one case, a cyberstalker posted a comment on the 
Internet about a woman, stating that “‘[she] was available for sex 
anytime of the day or night.’”111  The cyberstalker also posted the 
victim’s personal information—including her home telephone number 
and address.112  Numerous individuals called the victim in response to 
the posting, and she sought recourse by contacting state and local 
authorities in addition to the FBI.113  Unfortunately, authorities were 
unable to help her,114 which was likely due to the various difficulties 
involved in determining precisely who posted, viewed, and acted 
upon the Internet posting.115 
Furthermore, a drawback of such websites—and Internet speech 
more generally—is that locating and objecting to alarming speech 
online is as difficult as the Internet’s audience is expansive and 
scattered.116  As Scott Hammack observed in his article, “Justice 
Brandeis, in his dissent in Whitney v. California, noted that speech . . . 
should not be restricted as long as there is time to combat evil speech 
with more speech.  He believed the power of reason would triumph 
during a public discussion.”117  The idea that public discussion “will 
 
108 Hammack, supra note 75, at 82. 
109 Id. at 82–83. 
110 Id. at 83. 
111 Mishler, supra note 105, at 116–17. 
112 Id. at 116. 
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115 See id. 
116 Hammack, supra note 75, at 81. 
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defeat evil counsels” is one of the primary reasons for protecting 
expression.118 
Hammack went further to discuss how on the Internet, a public 
discussion is often impossible because of the difficulty in ensuring 
that the public can view and engage in both sides of a particular 
debate.119  In relation to the cyberstalking incitement example above, 
visitors of websites that encourage stalking and violence against 
specific people are unlikely to visit victim rights groups’ websites that 
refute the dangerous speech.120  Similarly, peaceful individuals likely 
do not visit websites supporting stalking and violence against others; 
therefore, the two sides of the debate are not engaged in a discussion, 
which could ultimately lead to the triumph of reason and the 
discovery of a principled “truth.” 
While anonymity, immediate communication, and large audiences 
are all features of cyberspace that contribute immensely to the free 
flow of ideas, such characteristics provide stalkers with endless, 
interrelated possibilities and loopholes.  Stalkers can use these 
loopholes to frighten other individuals with more intensity and 
frequency than is the case with offline stalking.  As such, Oregon 
courts and lawmakers should take the distinctions between 
cyberstalking and offline stalking into account when adjudicating 
cases or crafting policy. 
B.  The Credible Threat Requirement Is Unworkable in Cyberspace 
In 2006 and 2007, Valerie Goodness, an Oregon resident, received 
over nineteen pages of alarming e-mails from her ex-husband of four 
years, Ricky Beckham.121  The messages consisted mostly of 
language such as, “‘you fucking whore . . . I’m going to get you back, 
I’m getting my [s]on, you’ll never see him again, you[‘re] going to 
pay.’”122  Perhaps the most frightening e-mail Beckham sent, 
however, stated, “‘hope[fully] I CAN GET YOU WHERE NEED BE 
BEHIND BARS.’”123  During the parties’ marriage, Beckham 
repeatedly threatened and physically abused Goodness; at one point, 
Beckham threatened to kill Goodness, and he was arrested after 
 
118 Id. at 82. 
119 Id. 
120 See id. (discussing how visitors of an anti-Semitic website would be unlikely to visit 
a Jewish organization’s website objecting to the anti-Semitic speech). 
121 Goodness v. Beckham, 224 Or. App. 565, 570, 198 P.3d 980, 983–84 (2008). 
122 Id. at 569, 198 P.3d at 983. 
123 Id. at 570, 198 P.3d at 984. 
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punching her in the face and grabbing her by the throat.124  While the 
parties were married, Beckham also had physical altercations with 
Goodness’s older children, and he damaged property on multiple 
occasions in their home.125 
The last time Beckham abused Goodness was in 1998 or 1999, 
after which police had to remove Beckham from the couple’s 
residence.126  Despite this long history of violent and threatening 
behavior, the Oregon Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s 
decision granting Goodness a permanent stalking protective order, 
holding that Beckham’s e-mails did not threaten imminent violence 
against Goodness and were thus insufficient to satisfy a stalking 
protective order under Rangel.127  Goodness v. Beckham is a prime 
example of how the credible threat requirement can deny victims 
adequate relief and protection even when the victim’s fear may be 
reasonable given the context of the case and other factors. 
The Rangel requirements that the threat be “unequivocal” and 
conveyed specifically to the addressee128 make the credible threat rule 
problematic—especially as it pertains to cyberstalking—for several 
reasons.  First, the credible threat requirement creates a legal loophole 
for cyberstalkers in that they can—and often do—engage in conduct 
that does not explicitly threaten victims but that nonetheless causes 
them fear.129  In a 1998 National Institute of Justice study, two 
scholars reported that “[l]ess than half of all stalking victims are 
directly threatened by their stalkers, although the victims, by 
definition, experience a high level of fear.”130  Instead of making 
direct threats, stalkers frequently follow a pattern of behavior that 
would cause a reasonable person fear despite the absence of an 
explicit threat. 
The cyber context amplifies this issue, as various characteristics of 
the Internet allow stalkers to intimidate their victims with greater ease 
and frequency.131  For example, 
 
124 Id. at 567, 198 P.3d at 982. 
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127 Id. at 578, 198 P.3d at 988. 
128 State v. Rangel, 328 Or. 294, 306, 977 P.2d 379, 386 (1999). 
129 PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STALKING IN 
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Cyberstalkers . . . can easily use the Internet to send hundreds, even 
thousands, of frightening e-mail messages . . . in a matter of one 
hour, which over days and weeks can create havoc for a victim.  If 
there is not one explicit threat in any of those thousands of e-mail 
messages, then the victim cannot establish the credible threat 
requirement.132 
Thus, in such a situation, the victim has no legal remedy, and the 
cyberstalker can continue this frightening behavior knowing that there 
is little chance that he or she will face serious legal consequences. 
Second, a related problem with the credible threat requirement is 
that, by focusing on the alleged stalker’s expressions and conduct, the 
psychological harm that the victim will likely experience goes 
unnoticed.133  Moreover, the Rangel standard’s emphasis on the 
stalker’s behavior and potential of inflicting physical injury 
perpetuates the idea that harm from stalking occurs only when 
physical violence is involved or the threat is abhorrent.134  This belief 
discounts the possibility that actions and speech that appear benign or 
innocuous may, in reality, be part of a larger pattern of dangerous and 
frightening behavior.135 
Third, the Rangel standard’s requirement that the stalker convey a 
threat specifically to the addressee136 is problematic, particularly in 
regards to cyberstalking, as the target of the threat may be completely 
unaware of the threat’s existence and may never receive it—either 
directly or indirectly.137  This issue is especially pertinent when 
cyberstalkers post alarming and frightening language online or use 
technology to incite other individuals to commit violence against a 
specific person.  For example, in one tragic case out of California, the 
cyberstalker devoted an entire website to detailing his obsession with 
the victim, Amy Boyer, who was a classmate of his.138  The 
perpetrator used the Internet to collect personal information about 
Boyer;139 additionally, the cyberstalker posted information regarding 
Boyer’s whereabouts, activities, and attire on any given day.140  Not 
 
132 Goodno, supra note 6, at 137. 
133 Joseph C. Merschman, The Dark Side of the Web: Cyberstalking and the Need for 
Contemporary Legislation, 24 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 255, 268–69 (2001). 
134 See id. at 269. 
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136 State v. Rangel, 328 Or. 294, 306, 977 P.2d 379, 386 (1999). 
137 See Goodno, supra note 6, at 138. 
138 Id. 
139 Mishler, supra note 105, at 129–30. 
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only did the cyberstalker chronicle alarmingly specific details 
regarding Boyer’s life on his website, but also, he expressed thoughts 
about physically harming and possibly killing her.141 
In a horrific end to this course of behavior, the cyberstalker did in 
fact murder Boyer with a gun while she was at her dentist’s office.142  
Neither Boyer nor her family members and friends were aware of the 
cyberstalker’s website that he had operated for approximately two 
years.143  Even though this case did not go to trial, California 
prosecutors would likely have had difficulty proving that a credible 
threat existed because Boyer never received the threat—directly or 
indirectly.144  Thus, Rangel’s requirement that the threat be conveyed 
specifically to the addressee creates the potential for a troublesome 
dilemma, whereby the law might be unable to protect subjects of 
terrifying Internet speech until the stalker physically harms the 
victim.145 
Finally, Rangel’s credible threat requirement is problematic 
because it does not address situations in which the stalker assumes the 
identity of the victim online.  In such scenarios, a threat will likely not 
exist whatsoever in that the cyberstalker can post messages and 
detailed information online in the victim’s name, inviting other 
individuals to physically harm the victim.146  Therefore, the credible 
threat requirement in that context is essentially inapplicable to the 
analysis of whether or not a court should convict a defendant of 
criminal stalking. 
C.  Determining “Imminence” and “Present Ability” in Cyberspace 
Is Nearly Impossible 
The Rangel requirements that a communication “instill[] in the 
addressee a fear of imminent and serious personal violence from the 
speaker” and that the stalker had the “present ability” to carry out the 
 
141 Mishler, supra note 105, at 130. 
142 Id. at 129. 
143 Goodno, supra note 6, at 138. 
144 Id.; see also Mishler, supra note 105, at 122, 129 (arguing that California’s anti-
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threat147 are problematic in regards to cyberstalking for several 
reasons. 
First, language communicated in cyberspace is inevitably delayed, 
and the receiver or viewer of the speech does not “hear” the speech 
while it is being communicated.148  In other words, ascertaining 
whether a threat is imminent and if the cyberstalker had the present 
ability to carry out the threat at the moment that he or she “speaks” is 
infeasible because the victim may not view the speech until hours, 
days, or weeks after the cyberstalker “spoke.”149  Requiring that 
victims prove imminent physical harm and that the cyberstalker had 
the present ability to carry out the threat when victims may not have 
known of the threat’s existence is unfair and not in keeping with 
victims’ rights.  Oregon courts have not recognized how this time 
delay issue affects stalking adjudication.  Goodness v. Beckham 
demonstrated this problem.  Rather than analyzing whether there was 
a threat of imminent violence when the petitioner viewed the e-mails, 
the court appeared to analyze whether there was an imminent threat at 
the time that the respondent-defendant sent the e-mails.150 
Second, the victim may be completely unable to ascertain the 
location from which the stalker is communicating the threat; the 
stalker could be communicating from across the street, in a nearby 
town, or perhaps another state or country.  Again, requiring the victim 
to evaluate the imminence of a threat and the cyberstalker’s present 
ability to carry out the threat when the victim cannot ascertain the 
threat’s regional source imposes a burden of proof on victims that is 
unattainable and only adds to the hardship that victims of 
cyberstalking experience.  The victim’s lack of information regarding 
the physical location of the stalker and the stalker’s ability to hide 
within the virtual world creates the frightening possibility that the 
stalker could, in reality, be physically close to the victim while the 
threat is being communicated from miles away.  For example, the 
stalker could set up his or her e-mail account to automatically send 
alarming e-mails to the victim on a regular basis.151  This would 
allow the stalker to be in a location different from his or her computer 
but physically close to the victim without the victim’s knowledge—or 
 
147 State v. Rangel, 328 Or. 294, 303, 305–06, 977 P.2d 379, 384, 386 (1999). 
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perhaps even in direct conflict with the victim’s beliefs about the 
cyberstalker’s whereabouts.152 
Furthermore, in offline settings where the victim may be able to 
visually see the stalker based on proximity, the likelihood that the 
victim can accurately evaluate the risk of violence that the stalker 
poses is likely higher than in the cyberstalking context.  Factors such 
as body language, tone of voice, and the extent of physical space 
between the two parties—just to name a few—aid in assessing how 
imminent violence may be and the probability that the stalker can 
carry out a verbal threat.  The uncertainty as to the cyberstalker’s 
location makes proving imminent fear of personal violence and 
present ability to carry out a threat extremely arduous for 
cyberstalking victims. 
Third, the option to remain anonymous on the Internet also 
contributes to the complications of applying these requirements to 
cyberstalking cases.  If the victim does not know who is threatening 
him or her and has no way of identifying the perpetrator, the victim 
will have a diminished ability to determine how imminent the risk of 
violence truly is and whether the cyberstalker has the present ability 
to carry out a threat.153  To elaborate, without any identifying 
characteristics that may be associated with physical harm or danger—
such as a history of violent behavior and carrying out threats—the 
victim will likely be unable to determine accurately how dangerous 
the stalker could be.154  If the victim knows who the stalker is and can 
see the stalker, however, the victim will likely have a stronger ability 
to assess the immediate danger of the situation, the stalker’s 
intentions, and the stalker’s ability to carry out a threat.155 
The Internet is a very strong tool in the stalker’s arsenal: 
anonymity, rapid communication, widespread access, and the ability 
to assume the identity of the victim and to incite third parties online 
all allow cyberstalkers to increase fear in victims with more efficacy, 
while escaping culpability.  In addition, such aspects of the Internet, 
in conjunction with the fact that many stalkers do not explicitly 
threaten victims, severely impede victims’ ability to satisfy the 
credible threat requirement essential to the Rangel standard.156 
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Moreover, proving imminent personal violence and that the 
cyberstalker had the present ability to carry out the threat is 
practically impossible when the victim does not know the identity or 
location of the stalker.157  The inevitable delay in receiving a 
threatening message or viewing a threatening web posting further 
complicates the imminence analysis and challenges the 
appropriateness of the requirement.158  The Rangel decision as it 
stands does not adequately address this plethora of issues unique to 
cyberstalking, which leaves many victims with no protection.  
Therefore, lawmakers and the courts should reexamine the standard 
and revise it—or establish a new standard—so the law stays current 
with the times. 
III 
PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE RANGEL STANDARD TO ACCOUNT FOR 
CYBERSTALKING 
Because cyberstalking is profoundly different from offline stalking, 
courts cannot rigidly apply the same test to both forms of the crime in 
a workable fashion.  As such, a common-law test or a legislative 
enactment that takes into account the distinctions between offline and 
online stalking must be established.  This Part addresses the 
advantages of creating a rule that focuses solely on cyberstalking, 
while ensuring that the rule does not infringe upon free speech rights.  
Oregon courts and lawmakers should consider the proposals below as 
cyberstalking becomes a more ubiquitous form of criminal activity. 
A.  Abandon or Reform the Imminence Requirement 
Because there are many issues with evaluating imminence in 
cyberspace and because many threats made using electronic media 
never satisfy the imminence requirement, despite causing reasonable 
fear in victims, the new test should abandon the requirement or, at the 
very least, reinterpret it.  Imminence should not be required in 
cyberstalking cases because of the inherent delay involved in cyber 
communications and because the unique aspects of the Internet 
simply disallow the possibility of evaluating imminence accurately, if 
it all.  Because a cyberstalker can communicate with a victim 
anonymously and from anywhere in the world without the victim 
 
157 See id. at 138–39. 
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being able to discover this critical information, the victim simply 
cannot evaluate how imminent the risk of personal violence truly is.  
The obstacle involved in assessing imminence online places a 
tremendous burden on victims—a burden that is very difficult to 
prove.159 
In addition, in the cyberstalking context, there is always the risk 
that the stalker could carry out the threat before the victim has a 
chance to view the threat.160  This indicates a disconnect between the 
imminence requirement (and the Rangel standard more generally) and 
stalking that is committed online.  Because the imminence 
requirement is unworkable in cyberspace, many victims cannot meet 
their burden of proving imminent fear despite that their fear may be 
reasonable.  As a result of being unable to prove imminent fear, 
cyberstalking victims are often left with no legal recourse whatsoever, 
while cyberstalkers can continue their destructive behavior using the 
Internet loophole to escape liability.  The requirement that 
cyberstalking victims prove that their fear was imminent should thus 
be eliminated. 
If, however, courts retain the imminence requirement in the 
cyberstalking context, they must reinterpret the meaning of 
“imminence.”  Specifically, the standard would have to address the 
inherent delay between the moment that the cyberstalker sends or 
posts the injurious message and the moment when the victim finally 
views the message.161  To meet such a standard, the victim would 
have to prove a reasonable fear of imminent personal violence after 
he or she viewed the frightening speech—rather than at the time when 
the alleged cyberstalker sent the message or made the web posting.162  
This modification would help to close the gap between the 
cyberstalker’s initial threat and the victim’s viewing of the threat—
thereby reducing the strenuous burden on victims to prove imminent 
fear at a time when they potentially did not even know that a threat 
existed.  This reinterpretation, however, would likely not address how 
the difficulties in ascertaining imminence in cyberspace are 
 
159 See Cronan, supra note 1, at 428 (discussing how the imminence requirement in 
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exacerbated when individuals do not know the identity of the 
cyberstalker or the location from which the communication is being 
made. 
B.  Renounce the Credible Threat Requirement 
Because the credible threat requirement often denies protection to 
cyberstalking victims even when their fear is reasonable, many 
scholars argue that cyberstalking laws should not require a credible 
threat.163  Rather, the scholars argue that the laws should focus more 
on whether it is reasonable for the victim to feel fear for his or her 
safety based on the cyberstalker’s behavior.164  While the Rangel rule 
and ORS 163.732 do measure fear based on a reasonable person 
standard,165 the credible threat requirement is highly burdensome on 
cyberstalking victims, is unworkable in most cases, and allows 
cyberstalkers to avoid liability.  Therefore, the new standard should 
not require a credible threat but should focus on whether the victim’s 
fear is reasonable, given the context. 
At least ten states have enacted statutes specific to cyberstalking, or 
have amended state laws, to address the problems with the credible 
threat requirement.166  For example, the Iowa legislature amended its 
stalking statute in 1994 to nullify the credible threat requirement for 
the crime of stalking.167  The standard that the Iowa Legislature 
implemented sought to “criminalize[] a ‘course of conduct’ that may 
or may not include threats.”168  The legislature made a significant 
point of recognizing that victims of stalking can still experience 
reasonable fear even if expressive communications do not contain an 
overt threat, and even if the stalker does not have an apparent ability 
to carry out a threat.169 
Also, the State of Washington has two separate statutes for offline 
and online stalking—neither of which contain a credible threat 
requirement; rather, they both espouse a reasonable person 
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standard.170  Also, Florida’s anti-stalking law is similar to 
Washington’s in that it does not contain a credible threat.171  In 
describing why the legislature amended its general stalking law 
(which includes offline and online stalking), a Florida district court 
stated that the “statute was ‘designed to protect women from being 
harassed . . . by ensuring that victims did not have to be injured or 
threatened with death before stopping a stalker’s harassment.’”172  
These statutes tend to be more effective in ensuring that victims 
receive a legal remedy when their fear is reasonable and that 
cyberstalkers are held accountable.173 
C.  Specifically Address the Distinctive Characteristics of the Internet 
Third, the cyberstalking rule should specifically recognize the 
distinctive features of the Internet that make cyberstalking especially 
frightening.  The State of Washington’s cyberstalking statute is one of 
the most effective cyberstalking statutes in this regard, as it includes 
provisions regarding anonymity, repetitious communications, and 
third-party communications.174  In addition, the statute states that 
“‘[e]lectronic communication’ includes, but is not limited to, 
electronic mail, [I]nternet-based communications, pager service, and 
electronic text messaging.”175  This broader language combined with 
the provision that allows for third-party electronic communications176 
is preferable because it likely enables prosecutors to charge 
cyberstalkers who stalk by inciting third parties.177 
Furthermore, the Washington statute addresses the issues of 
delayed receipt of an intimidating communication and ambiguity as to 
the location of the offense by providing, “Any offense committed 
under this section may be deemed to have been committed either at 
the place from which the communication was made or at the place 
where the communication was received.”178  Such a provision is 
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three states that likely addresses all of the differences between offline and online stalking). 
175 Id. § 9.61.260(5). 
176 Id. § 9.61.260(1). 
177 See Goodno, supra note 6, at 146. 
178 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.61.260(4). 
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important because it recognizes the difficulty involved in requiring 
victims to prove reasonable fear at a time when they may not have 
known about the communication’s existence.  In addition, the 
provision allows for flexibility in regards to the jurisdiction in which 
prosecutors can charge suspects. 
The State of Illinois also has a distinct cyberstalking statute that 
addresses the specific characteristics of the Internet and does not have 
a credible threat requirement.179  The statute also has an explicit 
provision relating to incitement of third parties and webpages devoted 
to harming a certain individual.180  The provision states, in part, that a 
person commits cyberstalking when he or she “creates and maintains 
[a] . . . webpage which is accessible to one or more third parties” in 
order to place the victim in fear, threaten the victim, or solicit third 
parties to stalk the victim.”181  This provision of Illinois’ statute is 
significant because it addresses, in detail, the various ways in which 
cyberstalkers can use websites to carry out their mission of 
controlling and harming victims. 
The proposed cyberstalking law for Oregon should parallel much 
of Washington’s cyberstalking statute and incorporate a section 
similar to the provision in Illinois’ cyberstalking statute that prohibits 
the use of webpages to stalk individuals.  Specifically, the statute 
should apply to anonymous and repetitious communications as well 
as to communications made to the target of the stalking and to third 
parties.  In addition, there should be a provision explicitly stating that 
the offense of cyberstalking can be committed at either the place 
where the communication was made or the place where the 
communication was received.  Furthermore, the definition of 
“electronic communications” should explicitly include 
communications made to third parties on websites and web postings.  
Specifically, Oregon’s law should proscribe threats made on a 
webpage, language on a webpage that would place a reasonable 
person in the victim’s situation in fear, and language inciting third-
party visitors to the website to stalk the victim.  Such a provision will 
ensure that Oregon law recognizes how websites centered around 
stalking individuals can be a form of cyberstalking, even if the target 
of the stalking never receives the communication. 
 
179 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-7.5 (2010), amended by 2010 Ill. Legis. Serv. 96-1551 
(West). 
180 Id. at  5/12-7.5(a-5). 
181 Id. 
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The proposed cyberstalking statute would likely improve victims’ 
overall ability to obtain a stalking protective order when victims truly 
need that type of safety measure in place.  By replacing the credible 
threat and imminence requirements with the reasonable person 
standard, the proposed statute would lower victims’ overall burden 
from one that is nearly impossible to satisfy to a burden that would be 
more fair, yet still demanding.  In addition, the statute would reduce 
the likelihood of cyberstalkers escaping culpability through the 
Internet loophole by providing the State of Oregon with better tools to 
charge and prosecute suspected cyberstalkers. 
D.  Constitutionality of the Proposed Standard 
In order to ensure that the proposed rule does not violate the free 
speech provisions of the Oregon and federal constitutions, the rule 
should criminalize only conduct where the suspect “intentionally” or 
“willfully” intimidates, alarms, frightens, etc., another person.182  In 
addition, it is imperative that the proposed statute should address the 
“time, place, and manner” of electronic communications.  Courts 
often use this doctrine to uphold statutes that restrict speech by 
addressing an unreasonable time, place, or manner of expressive 
conduct—this ensures that the government is not prohibiting speech 
based on a disapproval of the views expressed (the speech’s 
“content”), which would be unconstitutional in most cases.183 
Oregon courts follow the time, place, and manner doctrine.184  The 
Oregon version of the doctrine requires that laws that regulate 
expression based on the time, place, or manner of speech must 
contain language defining some adverse effect of the speech that the 
legislative body intends to prevent.185  For example, in City of 
Portland v. Ayers, the Oregon Court of Appeals upheld a noise 
ordinance that banned the operation of any sound production device 
used: (1)“‘in such a manner as to cause a noise disturbance,’” (2) 
“‘between the hours of 10:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m.’” and is “‘plainly 
audible”’ within a dwelling that is not the source of the sound, or (3) 
 
182 See Goodno, supra note 6, at 155. 
183 Gene Barton, Taking a Byte out of Crime: E-mail Harassment and the Inefficacy of 
Existing Law, 70 WASH. L. REV. 465, 482 (1995). 
184 See generally Moser v. Frohnmayer, 112 Or. App. 226, 229–31, 829 P.2d 84, 85–86 
(1992) (discussing how only content-neutral time, place, and manner regulations that focus 
on prohibited effects of speech are constitutionally sound), aff’d, 315 Or. 372, 845 P.2d 
1284 (1993). 
185 City of Portland v. Tidyman, 306 Or. 174, 191, 759 P.2d 242, 251 (1988). 
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on public property and is “‘plainly audible’” fifty feet or more from 
the device.186 
The court held, in part, that because the ordinance regulated the 
time, place, and manner of expression with the goal of curbing an 
“invasive effect” of expression—noise disturbance—and not the 
content of the expression, the ordinance did not violate article 1, 
section 8 of the Oregon Constitution.187  In contrast, in City of 
Portland v. Tidyman, the Oregon Supreme Court held that a public 
nuisance ordinance regulating the locations of “adult businesses” 
violated article 1, section 8 because the ordinance did not adequately 
specify the adverse effects of the potentially obscene expression.188  
The City argued that adult bookstores contributed to “blight” and 
affected the “quality and stability” of neighborhoods, but the court 
asserted that the City’s findings were conclusory and vague—and 
thus, unpersuasive.189  The court discussed how the ordinance did not 
adequately describe how the sale of “adult” materials led to a public 
“nuisance.”190  Therefore, the court concluded, the ordinance would 
have the effect of banning certain materials because of their content—
namely, their sexual nature.191  Thus, the ordinance violated article 1, 
section 8.192 
Also, legal scholars have assessed the constitutionality 
requirements of cyberstalking statutes by looking to court cases 
regarding telephonic harassment statutes because the two forms of 
criminal activity are similar.193  For example, telephonic harassment 
statutes that ban anonymous, repeated, or late-night calls are all 
constitutional under the time, place, and manner doctrine as long as 
they satisfy other constitutional requirements.194 
 
186 City of Portland v. Ayers, 93 Or. App. 731, 733, 764 P.2d 556, 558 (1988) (quoting 
PORTLAND, OR. CITY CODE § 14.24.160 (1993)), review denied, 308 Or. 79 (1989). 
187 Id. at 735–36, 741, 764 P.2d at 559, 562 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
188 Tidyman, 306 Or. at 185–86, 190–91, 759 P.2d at 247-48, 250–51.  The Oregon 
Constitution does not ban obscenity outright—unlike the U.S. Constitution and other state 
constitutions.  State v. Henry, 302 Or. 510, 514–15, 525, 732 P.2d 9, 11, 17 (1987).  
Therefore, if an Oregon legislative body seeks to regulate obscenity, it must do so by 
addressing secondary effects of obscene materials that fall within the list of exceptions in 
State v. Henry.  Tidyman, 306 Or. at 179–80, 759 P.2d at 244. 
189 Tidyman, 306 Or. at 184–85, 759 P.2d at 247. 
190 Id. at 185, 759 P.2d at 247–48. 
191 Id. at 185–86, 759 P.2d at 248. 
192 Id. 
193 E.g., Barton, supra note 183, at 481; Goodno, supra note 6, at 155. 
194 Barton, supra note 183, at 482. 
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To ensure constitutionality under article 1, section 8, the proposed 
cyberstalking law should be consistent with Oregon’s time, place, and 
manner jurisprudence.  Specifically, the law must explicitly describe 
the secondary effects of cyberstalking and how stalking conducted on 
the Internet can cause more fear in victims than offline stalking 
can.195  The secondary effects that the proposed cyberstalking law 
should address should be repeated and unwanted contacts and the fear 
that those contacts produce.  This provision would likely be consistent 
with the court’s analysis in Rangel, in which the court stated that ORS 
163.732 is aimed at curbing “forbidden effects”—“repeated and 
unwanted contacts.”196 
Also, the proposed cyberstalking law should explicitly detail the 
“manner”197 of expression that it seeks to proscribe in order to 
achieve the goal of thwarting repeated, unwanted contacts and 
reasonable fear.  Meaning, for example, the law should include 
language banning, at the very least, “e-mail bombs” and anonymous 
messages based on the evidence that anonymity and e-mail bombs 
increase fear in stalking victims.198 
Finally, the proposed cyberstalking statute should contain a 
provision stating that it “does not include ‘constitutionally protected 
activity,’ including, but not limited to ‘picketing and organized 
protests.’”199  In sum, as long as the cyberstalking statute requires 
“intent” or “willingness” as its culpability level; focuses on the 
manner of electronic communications, including a detailed 
description of the adverse effects of stalking conducted on the 
Internet; and has a provision excluding constitutionally protected 
activity, the proposed rule should likely be constitutional.200 
 
195 See Tidyman, 306 Or. at 185–86, 759 P.2d 242, 247–48 (discussing how the 
ordinance at issue did not specifically address the adverse effects that the City wished to 
prevent, which contributed to the court’s decision that the ordinance was unconstitutional). 
196 See State v. Rangel, 328 Or. 294, 299, 977 P.2d 379, 382 (1999) (discussing how the 
criminal stalking statute was directed to the “forbidden effects” of expression). 
197 The “time” and “place” pieces of the time, place, and manner doctrine are not 
relevant to this analysis. 
198 This type of language would be similar to the Washington cyberstalking statute.  See 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.61.260 (West 2010) (criminalizing repetitious anonymous 
messages). 
199 Goodno, supra note 6, at 155. 
200 Barton, supra note 183, at 481–83; Goodno, supra note 6, at 155. 
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CONCLUSION 
As cyberstalking becomes a more pervasive and harmful social 
issue, Oregon courts cannot simply apply the same test to offline and 
online stalking.  Rather, courts and the legislature should recognize 
that cyberstalking and offline stalking are two different beasts—as 
such, these branches of government must evaluate the two forms of 
the crime through different lenses.  Specifically, it is imperative that a 
new or modified rule addresses, at least, the five main characteristics 
of cyberspace that can increase fear in victims and that can potentially 
cause more danger to society. 
In addition, Oregon courts should acknowledge that Rangel’s 
credible threat requirement is often unworkable and impractical in 
cyberspace as issues such as anonymity, “e-mail bombs,” and the 
possibility that victims will be unable to determine the location from 
which the communications are made can all increase fear in victims 
even if there is no explicit threat in the contents of the 
communications.  Furthermore, the same can be said with the 
imminence requirement—ascertaining and proving imminent fear is 
practically impossible in the age of the Internet. 
Because of these problems, a new standard should apply only to 
cyberstalking and should not require imminent fear or a credible 
threat—rather, the analysis should emphasize whether a reasonable 
person would feel fear based on the cyberstalker’s behavior and the 
context of the situation.  In addition, the standard must specifically 
address the distinguishing aspects of cyberspace—essentially, it must 
circumscribe the manner of electronic communications, which will 
ensure that Oregon courts treat cyberstalking cases differently from 
offline stalking cases.  The rule must contain the requisite culpability 
level of intent or willfulness in order to be effective and 
constitutionally sound.  Such a law would ensure that courts do not 
leave victims without protection when their fear may be reasonable, 
that cyberstalkers cannot hide from criminal liability, and that the 
government does not abridge individuals’ free speech rights in 
violation of the Oregon and federal constitutions.  Therefore, Oregon 
courts and the legislature should consider the foregoing 
recommendations because they better serve to protect the public 
interest as technology continues to advance and individuals continue 
to abuse the numerous benefits that the Internet provides. 
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